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Foreword  
Marie Sandberg, Associate professor, Director of AMIS, University of Copenhagen 
 
On February 26th, the Centre for Advanced Migration Studies (AMIS) organized the online seminar 
Danish desires to export asylum responsibility to camps outside Europe: A research-based 
discussion focusing on the legislative proposal of February 4th 2021: “Lov om ændring af 
Udlændingeloven (Indførelse af mulighed for overførsel af asylansøgere til asylsagsbehandling og 
indkvartering i tredjelande)” which translates into “Legislative reform of the Aliens Act (launching 
the possibility to transfer asylum seekers to case processing and residency in third countries)”.  
 
AMIS is an interdisciplinary migration research centre based at the Faculty of Humanities, 
University of Copenhagen, with a research focus on moving populations and mobility practices 
including irregularized and forced migration. Our aim with hosting the seminar was to contribute 
with research-based and multidisciplinary perspectives in order to discuss the proposal in light of 
recent developments in the Danish asylum system, and in a comparison with international practice, 
while the legislative proposal was still in its public hearing phase. 
 
Thanks to an excellent line-up of presenters: PhD Researcher at the Danish Institute for 
International Studies, Ahlam Chemlali, Associate Professor at AMIS, Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, 
senior researcher at the Danish Institute for Human Rights, Nikolas Feith Tan, and Associate 
Professor at AMIS, Zachary Whyte, the seminar succeeded in casting a much-needed research 
perspective on the current and past developments in Danish asylum politics. 
 
The seminar proved a very timely intervention, with an online audience of over 200 persons. These 
included academics from all over the world, Danish and international organizations and non-
government organizations, as well as policy makers and representatives from several countries´  
ministries and agencies, national and international monitoring bodies and also journalists. 
 
This would not have been possible without the hard work of AMIS coordinator Maria Frantzoulis 
and the assistance of the AMIS Master students Elena Patsy Horton, Othilia Christina Annie 
 
DANISH DESIRES TO EXPORT ASYLUM RESPONSIBILITY – AMIS SEMINAR REPORT 
5 
Pedersen, Teresa Alma Sigfusdottir and Simona Stejskalová, who helped by doing transcription and 
commentary. 
 
My sincere appreciation goes to Dr. Martin Lemberg-Pedersen for taking the initiative and 
smoothly organizing this timely event, also taking the lead in ensuring its materialization into this 
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Preface 
Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, AMIS, University of Copenhagen 
 
This report is the result of a collaborative effort based on the seminar convened at the Centre for 
Advanced Migration Studies´ (AMIS), the University of Copenhagen on Friday February 26th, 
2021, entitled Danish desires to export asylum responsibility to camps outside Europe: A research-
based discussion. The starting-point for the seminar was the ambition to shine a research-based, 
multidisciplinary and critical discussion on the Danish government’s legislative proposal to 
externalize Danish asylum processing and refugee responsibilities away from Danish territory, and 
through this, to inspire and impact the ongoing legislative hearing process.  
 
The seminar gathered four researchers, Ahlam Chemlali, Zachary Whyte, Nikolas Feith Tan and 
Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, who through their individual research were well positioned to engage 
with the proposal based on their in-depth knowledge of Danish and international asylum and 
migration policy. Scientifically, their backgrounds span the disciplines of sociology and political 
economy, ethnography and anthropology, law and international relations. In the seminar and now in 
this AMIS report, the presentations engaged with the proposal through discussions of the evolution 
of externalization in Danish and international contexts, of the intertwined dynamics of 
externalization, control and smuggling, with European-North African relations, of Danish asylum 
and integration policies involving camps, and of the international legal regimes concerning 
transnational asylum and border control. Each of these presentations has subsequently been 
converted into stand-alone, but complementary, written interventions designed to inform the public 
and political debate following the proposal. I would like to express my gratitude to the speakers, the 
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Danish Desires for Externalization and Non-Integration 
Dr. Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, Associate professor, AMIS, University of Copenhagen 
 
Introduction 
This paper assesses with the Danish Frederiksen-government´s legislative proposal to externalize 
asylum processing and refugee obligations from Danish territory. A challenge with this task is the 
absence of much information in the proposal. Several crucial questions remain unanswerable, 
including: Where the extra-territorial facilities are to be located; who has responsibility for them; 
which authorities Denmark will collaborate with; which standards the asylum processing will be 
exported to; the domestic or geopolitical context of the host country; how the hosts will treat 
minorities, and many more. This lack of information illustrates a circular justification in the 
proposed legislation: It posits that the policy will be in accordance with Danish international 
obligations and human rights standards, simply because if the Danish government decides to 
externalize asylum processing and refugees´ stay then it will be because it is in compliance with 
international obligations and human rights. At the current stage, such circular guarantees remain 
utterly hypothetical. Still, an analysis of the proposal helps to ascertain the rationale of policy-
makers, allow for contextualization of the policy drive, and also adds the case study of current 
Danish politics to the existing research literature on externalization. In what follows, I first explain 
the components of the proposed policy in more detail. Second, I introduce, define and reflect upon 
the concept of externalization, as a conceptual framework for understanding the Danish policy 
development. Third, after this, I turn back to consider the debates, framings and discussions, which 
have surrounded this particular externalization policy as it has evolved through both Danish and 
international contexts. Finally, I end up with some concluding remarks. 
 
The Danish proposal for externalization  
On February 4th, 2021, the Social Democrat Frederiksen-government sent out a legislative proposal 
for public consultations from a range of stakeholders, public agencies and civil society actors and 
organizations. It was accompanied by a legal note prepared by a Task Force working to realize the 
externalization of Danish asylum obligations, under the Ministry of Immigration and Integration. 
The consultation process was set to last one month. The proposal aims at shutting down Danish 
authorities´ processing of asylum claims, and granting of stay for refugees, on Danish territory. 
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Instead, these will be exported abroad to extraterritorial facilities in one or several unnamed and 
thus hypothetical countries. According to the legislative proposal, people filing asylum applications 
in Denmark should undergo an accelerated procedure assessing their “transferability” 
[overførselsposition] to extra-territorial facilities or camps outside Europe1, where the host country 
is allegedly required to act in accordance with certain rights standard. These are derived from what 
appears to be a minimalistic reading of the 1951 Refugee Convention.2 Two models are proposed, 
where the facilities are placed either under the authority of Denmark or under that of a host country. 
 
The proposal envisions a significant upscaling of incarceration and detention of asylum seekers as 
early as possible in their processes, for the purpose of ensuring asylum seekers´ “transferability”. 
The extraterritorial facilities will not allow for successful asylum applicants to travel to Denmark, 
nor would people be allowed to file asylum applications at these facilities. If such a facility is 
located in Country X, then it won't be possible for people to show up at the camp in Country X and 
apply for asylum on Danish territory. And whether people get asylum or not, they are to remain in 
Country X. In the words of the proposal: 
 
Through such a transfer to a third country, an asylum application originally launched in 
Denmark will no longer lead to a residency permit in Denmark. The model is therefore built 
on a presupposition that Denmark would not offer protection in cases where foreigners are 
granted asylum after due processing of asylum applications in the third country. The 
protection will, on the contrary, be granted by the third country in question. If the 
applicant´s asylum application is refused, it will similarly be the third country in question, 
who will ensure the return of the person.3 
 
According to the proposal, the processing facilities are to be constructed after an “agreement or 
equivalent arrangement with a third country” requiring that country to act in accordance with 
                                                 
 
1 Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2021: 29. 
2 The proposal mentions some possible exceptions, such as the right to privacy and family life, seriously ill foreigners, 
Dublin transfers, as well as other poorly defined “groups of foreigners,” which can be exempted due to “resource or 
other factual considerations.” Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2021: 11. 
3 Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2021: 5, author´s translation. 
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certain obligations.4 It is difficult to say anything substantial about the concrete rights and 
obligations postulated in the proposal due to its hypothetical character. But as the proposal is 
accompanying a stated government vision of halting spontaneous refugee movement to Denmark 
through a large-scale, transnational system of migration control, such a legislation will, if attempted 
realized, have vast implications for the Danish policies on refugee protection. 
 
Understanding Externalization 
The legislative proposal can be understood as an instance of border externalization. This concept 
can be defined as a series of actions or steps whereby actors compliment policies to control 
migration across their territorial boundaries with initiatives for extraterritorial management through 
other public, private or non-state agencies than their own.5 The above definition is derived from just 
about two decades of research into externalization processes. We can refer to this literature via the 
shorthand externalization studies. From the perspective of the externalizing actor or state, the policy 
works through a preventive logic, so that people´s ability to arrive on a territory where they can 
exercise the right to apply for asylum is pre-empted. Although externalization studies typically 
concern relations between countries from the global north and south, such policies are also pursued 
in north-north and south-south relations. For instance, the EU´s Dublin Regulation effectively 
transforms countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain into the externalized border guards of the 
North-Western member states. 
   
But with the Danish proposal, this logic seems to be coupled with an intention to empty the 
country´s protection system of content in Denmark, by exporting it to another location. But it is 
worth noting that while the current legislative proposal constitutes a fundamental break with the 
Danish and most other countries´ asylum system, Danish migration control policies already rely on 
the externalization of border control. This happens for instance through Frontex operations in the 
Union´s border regions as well as via bilateral agreements with countries like Ghana and Tunisia. 
Indeed, such forms of externalized control are far from new. Horrific examples continue to occur 
across regions like the Maghreb and Sahel, and in countries like Libya, Morocco, Niger, Algeria, 
                                                 
 
4 Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2021: 10. 
5 Lemberg-Pedersen, ”Effective protection or effective combat?”; Moreno-Lax and Lemberg-Pedersen, ”Border-induced 
displacement.” 
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and outside Europe also in Australia´s Pacific Solution, which have involved camps on Nauru and 
Papa New Guinea. The legality, functionality and issues of accountability of externalization for 
human rights has been dealt with extensively in the research literature.6 Some analyses have dealt 
with the contentious discussions between EU Member States about the locations of such migrant 
camps.7 Other works have dealt with the political cross-fertilization of ideas between geographical 
regions such as Australia, USA and Europe.8 Externalization is often portrayed as the decoupling 
and export of border policing beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. However, the 
particular Danish policy envisioned would in fact multiply the levels of border control. The addition 
of an extraterritorial layer of control outside Denmark will not serve its purpose unless it is tied to a 
domestic system that upscales both the incarceration and deportation of asylum seekers. This 
particular externalization proposal would therefore more accurately double down on territorial 
migration controls.  
 
Irregularity, economic incentives and issue-linkages in externalization 
There has been close to no engagement from the Danish government side with the body of research 
in externalization studies. Instead, after 2017, it contracted a small consultancy firm Migration 
Management Advice (MMA) to conduct a media campaign, write pieces in the Social Democrats 
member magazine, perform talks and presentations of the proposal, and publish comments in 
national media outlets. This led to peculiarly circular justifications where the party´s politicians 
would refer to comments from the consultancy firm as proof of independent expert support of their 
externalization policy. Here, it will not be possible to accurately relate the proposal to all possible 
points of relevance in the burgeoning externalization literature. But we can focus on three such 
points: The creation of border-induced displacement, the link between externalization and markets 
for border control, and the role of issue-linkages and policy transfers. 
 
                                                 
 
6 cf. Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Access to Asylum”; Bialasiewicz, ”Off-shoring and out-sourcing the border of Europe”; 
Casas-Cortes et al., ”Riding routes and itinerant borders”; Moreno-Lax, ”Accessing Asylum in Europe.” 
7 Noll, ”Visions of the exceptional”; Hansen, ”EU migration policy in the post-Amsterdam era”; Lemberg-Pedersen, 
”Losing the right to have rights.” 
8 Hyndman, and Mountz, “Another brick in the wall?”; Mussi and Feith Tan, ”Comparing Cooperation on Migration 
Control.” 
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First off, externalization seems to facilitate irregular forms of displacement. For years, a large 
number of reports have linked the policy to undocumented existence, reliance on smugglers, 
massive rights violations9 and what I have elsewhere called border-induced displacement.10 Briefly, 
this concept denotes how states´ control policies are not just reactive responses to displacement. 
They are also engines of their own distinct and dangerous forms of (re)displacement. If realized, the 
Danish proposal could facilitate such movements, in the form of the reliance on smugglers, the 
administrative transfers to detention facilities in third countries, and the extraterritorial mobility 
control over exercised there. 
 
Second, externalization studies have also dealt with the kinds of incentives that this policy drive 
creates when it comes to border security and the militarization of migration control. A lot of control 
and surveillance equipment is necessary in order to realize the goals of pre-emptive migration 
control and containment of potential asylum seekers. Here, an important literature examines the 
contractual regimes underpinning such infrastructures, and how such political economies map onto 
European policies imposing control on and outside European territory.11 Of course, markets of 
border control are not always equivalent to spheres of externalization. States and organizations 
typically reap numerous contracts for control technologies within states´ own territories. But 
externalization constitutes a troublesome corner of such industrial relations because it requires 
engagement with the military and security sectors of so-called third countries. Often these are 
already involved domestic repression, rights violations, population and minority persecution and 
violent control of migrants. When these institutions are turned into lucrative export markets for 
European and other military, security and ICT sectors, this can escalate cycles of violence, abuse 
and exploitation. A particularly damaging dynamic is the way in which many arms companies do 
not just export border infrastructure, but also conventional weapons. Such actors thereby derive 
                                                 
 
9 cf. Human Rights Watch, “Pushed Back, Pushed Around”; Amnesty International, “The human rights risks of external 
migration policies”; Carrera et al., “Offshoring asylum and migration.” 
10 Lemberg-Pedersen, “Forcing Flows of Migrants”; Lemberg-Pedersen, “Effective protection or effective combat?”; 
see also Moreno-Lax and Lemberg-Pedersen, “Border-induced displacement.” 
11 Lemberg-Pedersen, ”Private security companies and the European borderscapes”; Kumar, “Securing through 
Technology”; Baird, “Interest groups and strategic constructivism”; Lemberg-Pedersen et al., “The political economy of 
entry governance”; Salas-Lopez and Godenau, “In private hands?” 
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profit not just from the original causes of displacement, but also from states subsequent control of 
the displaced through surveillance and control technologies. The way in which lucrative economic 
incentives are increasingly weaved into the fabric of externalized control also highlight predictable 
challenges with accountability and lacking political desires to investigate such violations. As such, 
the policy is associated with great risks for populations and migrants alike. 
 
While the current Danish proposal is both significantly underdetermined and may also not be 
realized other measures could follow such a track. Thus, alongside its Austrian counterpart, the 
Danish government already announced a partnership on border security with Tunisian security 
forces in early 2020.12 Awareness of the political economy of border control help clarify that any 
political vision of extraterritorial pre-emption, containment and deportation, will require material 
infrastructures and contractual relations and associated economic incentives. This point is often lost 
on national politicians who talk of upscaled control regimes through generic and state-centric 
analogies which blur the political-diplomatic, contractual, and legal implications of policy.  
 
Regarding the third point, an emergent part of the literature on externalization arrangements 
concerns issue-linkages and policy transfers reflecting the diplomatic relations necessary to enact 
this kind of policy.13 Existing arrangements illustrate that externalized control policies are often 
linked to other issues, such as economic compensation (demanded by Gaddafi from the EU in 
2010), visa liberalisation and membership (demanded by Turkey after the controversial EU-Turkey 
Statement). In the case of Morocco, Spain and the EU, the issues have been fisheries agreements as 
well as the Moroccan colonial occupation of Western Sahara. Even though the latter flies in the face 
of the EUs own policy, it has been tacitly accepted by the union, because of Morocco´s strategic 
role in migration control. From European states´ perspective it has also often revolved around the 
conditional transfer of development aid, if non-European states align themselves with restrictive 
European migration policies. Externalization is thus not an isolated policy venue. 
 
                                                 
 
12 Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration. 2020. Danmark og Østrig vil stoppe migrantstrøm, før den 
når EU [Denmark and Austria will stop migration flow before it reaches the EU]. Available at: 
https://uim.dk/nyheder/danmark-og-ostrig-vil-stoppe-migrantstrom-for-den-nar-eu. 
13 cf. Cassarino, “Beyond the criminalization of migration.” 
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It is impossible to flesh out the political venues affected by the Danish proposal, as the legislation is 
void of candidate countries and thus of crucial contexts. But at a general level, any international 
arrangement transfers political and often also financial capital between the transactional partners. 
The case of Turkey illustrates how the EU abruptly changed its own policy by categorizing the 
country as a safe for returns. This is not to say that externalization deals are situations where passive 
and humanitarian European states are blackmailed by unscrupulous non-European ones. Although a 
standard narrative in European media, it is important to acknowledge that European countries are 
often initiating such arrangements, and that the quid pro quo between externalization partners 
follows from how European governments seem willing to avoid asylum seekers at any cost. These 
risks also hover over the Danish government´s externalization plans. Finally, while it is clear that 
much literature has operationalized the concept of externalization for critical inquiry, it is worth 
noting its inherent risk of Western-, Euro- or state-centrism.14 This may lead to flawed assumptions 
of a particular directionality in such policies, for instance from Denmark of Europe outwards. But 
the implications of externalization arrangements often run both ways. In what follows, the proposal 
will be analyzed through four claims asserted by the Frederiksen-government and the criticisms 
these have faced. 
 
Tracing the Danish policy drive: Innovation or recycling? 
A first claim has been that the externalization proposal is a ground-breaking and innovative fix for a 
broken global asylum system. In fact, however, the rationale is anything but new. Both in short-
term Danish politics, and in the longer span of (failed) Northern European initiatives. Thus, in 2014, 
the Danish People´s Party suggested that all Syrian asylum seekers should be immediately deported 
to camps in Uganda, which they claimed, could serve as a region of origin for them. The same year, 
the Liberal Alliance party presented a vision of carving out “small pieces of Denmark” in Lebanon 
and Jordan to which all war refugees should be sent.15 None of these initiatives were realized. 
 
                                                 
 
14 El Qadim, “Postcolonial Challenges to Migration Control.” 
15 Gjertsen, M. N., & Kaae, M. 8.10.2014. Liberal alliance: Afvis alle krigsflygtninge. [Liberal Alliance: Reject all war 
refugees]. Jyllandsposten. Retrieved from https://jyllands-posten.dk/politik/ECE7093609/Liberal-Alliance-Afvis-alle-
krigsflygtninge/. 
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But already back in 1986, the Danish Schlüter-government proposed the creation of extraterritorial 
“processing centres” during a session in the UN´s Third Committee. Here, however, the idea was 
fiercely rejected as lacking solidarity, and calls were made for countries from the global North to 
exhibit genuine solidarity instead. In 1993-5 the Dutch minister Aad Kosto then revived the idea. 
During intergovernmental consultations he suggested extraterritorial “reception centres,” and 
explicitly referred to the US Guantanamo Bay camp as a model to be replicated. These calls to rally 
his counterparts were, however, in vain. Then, in 2002-3, the British Blair-government, seconded 
by its Danish and Dutch counterparts, launched a large campaign for “regional protection areas” 
and “transit processing zones” in Eastern Europe and North Africa. This took place during the 
incredibly contentious run-up to the American invasion of Iraq, where the three countries 
controversially abandoned the German and French, stance, in favor of the American Bush II-
government. The externalization proposal was coupled with the invasion and the need for an 
“interventionist” foreign policy, but Blair had miscalculated, and faced a barrage of criticism from 
other European countries, humanitarian organizations and the European Parliament, whereafter the 
initiative quickly collapsed.16  
 
Subsequent discussions have revolved around “EU reception centres” and whether these should be 
located within or outside the Union, and in 2018, the Council of Ministers issued a press release 
with a vision of “regional disembarkation platforms” in North Africa to which all boat migrants 
should be administratively deported.17 However, this press release was, surprisingly, presented 
without previous consultations or negotiations with African states. Moreover, it was never followed 
up with concrete measures, and seemed to run counter to the views of the European Commission, 
who has repeatedly emphasized that asylum obligations should not be exported outside European 
territory. The fact that the Council consists of the Justice and Home Affairs ministers and civil 
servants of the Member States lends itself to an interpretation where the press release reflects a 
continuing European desire to reap political capital of externalization visions in the domestic 
politics of some Member States. As such, the policy is thus far from innovative, but rather 
represents a decade-long dream recycled by political and civil servant-networks from some 
                                                 
 
16 Noll, ”Visions of the exceptional”; Hansen, ”EU migration policy in the post-Amsterdam era”; Lemberg-Pedersen, 
”Losing the right to have rights”; Lemberg-Pedersen, “Effective protection or effective combat?” 
17 Lemberg-Pedersen, “Manufacturing displacement.” 
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Northern European countries. But while a small group of countries have pursued the idea, thus far 
many more European countries have rejected it as lacking realism and pragmatism. 
 
The humanitarianization of externalization policy 
Another claim is that the envisioned policy is humanitarian, since it can disrupt the cynical and 
deadly Mediterranean smuggling networks, and offer good living standards in the so-called third 
countries. Partnerships with named host countries, the EU and the UNHCR were repeatedly 
referenced in order to accentuate the proposal´s humanitarian flavour. Several points can be 
discussed when assessing this claim. 
 
First, the notion that the tragic deaths of migrants can be disrupted by preventing people from 
reaching the Mediterranean is of course peculiar, and possibly reflects the Frederiksen-
government´s lacking engagement with existing research literature on the complex linkages 
between displacement, border control and smuggling dynamics. After all, according to several 
analysis of fatality data and the measurement of unsafe migration, many more migrants lose their 
lives before they ever reach the Mediterranean, which is also more monitored relative to practices of 
state authorities in f.i. North Africa.18 Authorities lacking will to record migrant deaths is 
inextricably linked to the kinds of securitized and militarized control regimes pursued through the 
aforementioned externalization measures, and the ripple effects of border-induced displacement 
they create through regions. 
 
Second, a certain trajectory is observable when comparing early and later Social Democrat 
campaign discourses. In 2016, the politician Peter Hummelgård Thomsen referred to the idea as a 
vision of “enormous refugee cities with hospitals, schools, universities, farms and companies.”19 
However, quickly confronted with the lacking realism of identifying willing hosts for such grand-
scale projects, his colleague, Henrik Sass Larsen, shortly after toned down ambitions, talking 
instead to massive “asylum camps” operated in partnership with the EU and the UNHCR. He 
                                                 
 
18 Singleton, Laczko and Black, “Measuring unsafe migration”: IOM, “Fatal Journeys.” 
19 Hummelgaard, P. 6.1.2016. Nej, vi socialdemokrater er ikke Dansk Folkeparti light. Politiken. [No, we Social 
Democrats are not Danish Peoples Party light]. Available at: https://politiken.dk/debat/kroniken/art5605975/Nej-vi-
socialdemokrater-er-ikke-Dansk-Folkeparti-light. 
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specifically referred to Libya or Algeria as prospective hosts. Unfortunately for the campaign, both 
the UNHCR and the EU refused to be drafted into the lofty Danish visions.20 Accordingly, in early 
2018, the vision was downscaled once more, to concern the more welcome-sounding “reception 
centres” in North Africa. However, a string of countries, who were surprised to suddenly find 
themselves to be centre-pieces of a Social Democratic campaign across Denmark, spoke up against 
the idea in no uncertain terms. As would also be the case with the Council of Ministers´ 2018 press 
statement of regional disembarkation platforms, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Libya and 
Egypt refused the assigned host duties, and communicated in no uncertain terms that they found the 
plan undesirable, hypocritical and harmful.21 Put bluntly, every country named by various 
politicians has refused. It was after this point that the Social Democratic Party decided to stop 
naming specific host countries in their campaign. This is presumably also the reason why this 
crucial aspect of the externalization policy is absent from the legislative proposal. Still, the policy 
drive continued into early 2021, where the ambitions received another notch down, when Minister 
of Immigration and Integration, Mattias Tesfaye, explained that the goal was now to construct an 
experimental “mini-centre” in the – now unnamed – host country.22 The quick spiral of the 
externalization vision from “enormous refugee cities” to experimental “mini-centres” can be seen as 
testifying to the lacking cohesion between the political campaign and the reality of displacement 
contexts. 
 
                                                 
 
20 Damkjær, O. 5.2.2018. Tvivl om FNs rolle i socialdemokratisk asylforslag. [Doubt about the United Nation´s role in 
Socialdemocratic asylum proposal]. Berlingske Tidende. Available at: https://www.berlingske.dk/politik/tvivl-om-fns-
rolle-i-socialdemokratisk-asylforslag. 
21 See f.i. Mansø, R.G. 6.2.2018. Tunesien vil ikke huse Mette Frederiksens lejr. [Tunisia does not want to host Mette 
Frederiksen´s camp]. dr.dk. Available at: https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/tunesien-vil-ikke-huse-mette-frederiksens-
lejr; Ritzau. 7.2.2018. Marokko afviser S-forslag om dansk modtagecenter. [Morocco rejects Socialdemocratic proposal 
for a Danish reception centre]. Jyllandsposten. Available at: https://jyllands-
posten.dk/international/Afrika/ECE10288134/marokko-afviser-sforslag-om-dansk-modtagecenter/. 
22 Klarskov, K. 24.1.2021. Mattias Tesfaye er gået på jagt hos ”en god håndfuld” lande for at finde et sted til et 
modtagecenter for asylansøgere. Politiken. [Mattias Tesfaye has gone hunting after “a good handful” countries to find a 
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Third, the legislative proposal´s openly stated intention to upscale incarceration of asylum seekers 
seems problematic given the Frederiksen-government´s humanitarian appeals. This incarceration is 
to happen in two ways: First in Denmark, where pre-removal detention is to ensure quick and 
efficient “transfers” outside Danish territory. But it also features after such transfers, where third 
country authorities presumably are to keep people in the facilities during their case processing. And 
they would also be responsible for ensuring their deportation after asylum rejections. Such a policy 
measure seems to create powerful incentives for displaced people to avoid registering in the Danish 
asylum system altogether, both in its European and potentially extraterritorial manifestations. 
Already today, an increasing number of people targeted for returns in the Danish asylum system go 
underground in order to avoid the hopeless, controlled and surveilled existence in the new departure 
centres and -prisons such as Kærshovedgaard and Ellebæk. If all asylum seekers are to be processed 
through this system of despair, it seems likely that such escapes to irregularity in Denmark or 
elsewhere would only escalate. This could accelerate the expansion of irregular and precarious 
migrant populations forced to reside in the shadows of one of the world´s richest countries. And 
given that this irregularity is already pervasive also in Europe´s external border regions, the 
insertion of more extraterritorial structures of containment and deportation would appear not to lead 
to a more humane migration system, but instead to exacerbate the dynamics of precarity. This 
incentivization of irregular existence would of course be tantamount to the loss of the very ability of 
authorities to humanely manage migration, that the Danish government has used to justify its 
externalization proposal. 
 
A fourth claim is that the policy will fix a broken and dysfunctional asylum system because it will 
deter asylum seekers from travelling to Denmark in the first place. Thus, according to this line of 
thinking, when people realize the dire prospects of being immediately deported to processing 
facilities outside Europe, they will make better choices (understood as the choice not to come to 
Denmark). However, this claim too faces multiple problems. This is connected to deep-seated 
assumptions about the effect of deterrence measures, which permeate Danish asylum politics. On 
this view, migrants´ inability to reach Denmark safely, and the threat of automatic deportation to a 
third country if they do, is not understood as undermining the system of protection. Instead, it is 
seen as a clever way to minimize the number of people entering the Danish asylum system. As 
such, the administrative transfers to extraterritorial facilities can be seen as another stage of the 
deterrent effect desired also by the departure centres. 
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Underneath this deterrence logic we find an assumed relevance of the neoclassical push-pull model. 
This has been problematized in much migration research,23 and it also appears unnuanced and 
generic when applied to the transnational geographies, histories and political economies of 
(externalized) border control. This is illustrated by the externalization proposal´s creation of 
incentives for people to avoid the Danish asylum system altogether, mirroring people´s current 
choices to move underground to avoid the departure centres. Even if extraterritorial facilities and 
administrative transfers were set in motion, the quality of the accompanying statistical data would 
be fundamentally flawed. 
 
Moreover, the combination of this deterrence logic with the government´s humanitarian discourse 
also leads the proposal into nonsensical terrain. For it is puzzling that it actually seems to require 
people to travel to Danish territory in order to access the asylum processing in the unnamed third 
country. This is so because several of the government´s ministers have been adamant that people 
would not be allowed to apply for asylum at the extraterritorial facilities, nor be resettled from these 
to Danish territory. This aspect appears paradoxical given the government´s repeated emphasis on 




The Frederiksen-government´s legislative proposal claims to address a broken asylum system that is 
increasingly dysfunctional. But organizations, researchers, scholars and activists have long argued 
that the system suffers from serious problems and is increasingly challenged. A crucial difference 
between these two discourses, however, is that the latter does not mean that its humanitarian 
rationale has seized to work. Such a claim would disregard the many tens of thousands of people 
who every year experience the benefits of receiving protection through asylum systems. It is 
possible both to acknowledge the humanitarian value of European countries´ territorially based 
asylum systems, and shining a critical light on why the global asylum system is challenged and 
dysfunctional. But this requires looking at the systemic causes.  
                                                 
 
23 cf. De Haas, “Migration transitions.” 
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Arguably, a prime reason for the system´s current challenges is how states from the global North 
have turned towards deterrent and externalized migration control policies, and enacted a systematic 
closure of legal escape and protection corridors between the world´s poorest and richest countries. 
Until the mid-2000s, people could apply for asylum on Danish embassies. If the Frederiksen-
government´s goal is to undermine the business of the smugglers, and ensure safe migration routes, 
then reviving this idea seems an obvious candidate. But the proposal´s political emphasis is more on 
avoiding than protecting asylum seekers in Denmark. And it assumes that hypothetical host 
countries can host many asylum seekers and refugees despite the fact that all countries proposed by 
Denmark and other European countries have rejected the plans. Externalization efforts do not take 
place in state-centric vacuums, but within political-economic contexts. Despite a focus on the 
flawed push-pull logic and its incentives, the Danish government´s lacking engagement and 
knowledge of research on externalization means that it disregards a series of systemic and political 
economic incentives that the policy would create in and beyond Europe. The likelihood that the 
policy will accelerate regional and commercial incentives for border militarization and irregular 
mobility, violations of migrant rights and domestic repression poses serious risks to long-term 
European and international solidarity when it comes to collaborating on mass displacement policies. 
 
Recent postcolonial analysis of the political imaginary of European externalization efforts has 
examined its longer continuities and reoccurrence. Contingent parallels exist between rationales as 
expressed in the Danish proposal, and those of colonial and imperial policies. Cases include 
nineteenth century extraterritorial projects related to the management of slave trade refugees 
“recaptured” during abolitionist naval interventions. The deeply racialized American and British 
societies deemed it undesirable to integrate the emancipated slaves, and instead pursued the 
externalization of their residence to so-called philanthropic colonies in Africa, such as Sierra Leona 
and Libera.24 The chasm between the proposal´s deterrence logic and its humanitarianized discourse 
is aligned with the ongoing transformation of the Danish asylum system from one of protection to 
one of temporariness and deportation. The political desire to exhibit real deterrence effects of 
strongly symbolic initiatives is coupled with a claimed impossibility of receiving and integrating 
                                                 
 
24 Lemberg-Pedersen, “Manufacturing displacement.” 
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even low numbers of asylum seekers and refugees. But even if the externalized policy were to be 
realized in some form, the aforementioned risks of (un)intended side-effects and incentives, such as 
irregular mobility and precarious existence, would greatly undermine any ability to accurately 
monitor and evaluate its actual outcome. Any evaluation requires consistent criteria, and it can be 
argued that the externalization proposal is in fact opposite of an innovative and humanitarian break 
with a dysfunctional protection system. Rather, it seems a radical step in a decade-long process 
draining the Danish asylum system of its protection substance, instead turning it towards the goal of 
non-integration. The proposal can be seen as the attempt to negate and outsource the reception and 
integration of refugees into society. 
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North African dynamics and European partnerships on 
border control 
Ahlam Chemlali, Ph.D. Fellow, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) 
 
Introduction 
The Danish Frederiksen-government legislative proposal aims to close Danish authorities´ 
processing of asylum claims on Danish territory. Asylum seekers are instead to be transferred to 
camp-structures outside Europe, where those granted refugee statuses will also stay. While the 
proposal has yet to name a host country, the Social Democrats, have for years used “North Africa” 
explicitly in their campaigns as a potential site for constructions of camps outside Europe. This 
paper contextualizes the Danish discourses on exporting asylum and border facilities to non-
European third countries, such as "North Africa," by discussing dynamics in North African 
countries when it comes to European attempts to conclude partnerships on border control and 
security. The first section outlines the externalization of migration controls, followed by the 
dynamics in the Maghreb region. A third section investigates the claims and justifications made in 
the legislative proposal by the Danish government and finally a closing remark draws out the 
unintended consequences and unanswered questions.  
 
Irregular migration and border control 
Irregular migration, and migration from and through North Africa in particular, has been rendered 
synonymous with the European Unions purported "loss of control" of its borders. This has supplied 
the pretext for what has in fact been not only a continuous intensification of militarized control of 
the southern border, but also an externalization of the borders into Africa.1  
 
The externalization of migration controls to third countries has become one of the central pillars of 
the European Union’s (EU) migration policy.2 Since the late 1990s, the EU has sought to outsource 
“migration management” to third countries in order to prevent irregular migrants, including asylum 
                                                 
 
1 Akkerman, “Expanding the fortress.”; Fine, “All At Sea.” 
2 European Commission, “Improving Migration Management in the North of Africa Region.” 
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seekers, from reaching EU territory.3 This is particularly true for the policies in North Africa – 
especially in the Maghreb countries.4 The Social Democrats, both before and after they were voted 
into office, have been very explicit about North Africa being a potential host region. Despite the 
current proposal not mentioning any region, this merits a closer look at externalization dynamics in 
this region. 
 
After the 2000s, a massive acceleration in border externalization measures has taken place. 
As the Council of Europe has noted, this involves outsourcing “border controls to third-countries 
with notorious human rights records.”5 As a result, the United Nations (UN) and human rights 
organisations have catalogued a spectrum of violence and human rights abuses in North Africa by 
State as well as non-State actors.6 This has however not prompted the EU to halt the externalization 
policies, on the contrary, the EU continues funneling millions of Euros into North Africa,7 
prompting a set of financial incentives created under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 
(EUTF), including suggestions from Member States of opening migrant reception centres, 
particularly in Morocco and Tunisia.8 This has however quickly been rejected by Maghrebi states, 
as this idea has long been resisted by countries in the global South and North Africa in particular.9   
European Member States have been pressing to get Morocco and Tunisia onto a list of so-called 
"safe third countries" on to which to offload people seeking asylum. Here, Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia are particularly targeted as potential countries to be listed despite the concerning human 
rights situation that prevails in these countries. The use of the notion of “safe countries” has serious 
consequences for the rights of asylum seekers. Some of these include expedited examination of 
                                                 
 
3 Badalič, “Tunisia’s Role in the EU External Migration Policy.” 
4 Gazzotti and Hagan, “Dispersal and dispossession as bordering.”  
5 Council of Europe, “Council of Europe member states must assume more responsibility for rescuing migrants 
at sea and protecting their rights”; Limmam and Del Sarto, “Periphery Under Pressure.”   
6 Oberoi et al., "The Enemy at the Gates."; Casas-Cortes et al. “‘Good Neighbours Make Good Fences’” Chemlali, 
”Migranter i Libyen befinder sig i en stadigt vanskeligere situation, som Danmark og EU har et medansvar for” cf. 
Human Rights Watch, ”World Report 2021” 
7 Zanker, “Managing or restricting movement?”; Abderrahim, “A Tale of Two Agreements”; European Parliament, 
“The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)”,  
8 European Commission, “Improving migration management in the North of Africa region” 
9 Witschge, “European proposals to outsource asylum centres condemned” 
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applications, non-suspensive appeals, likely rejection of the claim or, in the case of «safe third 
countries», inadmissibility of the asylum application. However, no country can be presumed safe, 
including Maghreb countries or even Member States of the European Union (EU).10 
 
Dynamics in the Maghreb region 
The fragility of the rule of law in the Maghreb countries does not guarantee the rights of people 
within their jurisdiction, and numerous rights violations are regularly reported by international 
organizations and civil society. 11 Nevertheless, some European countries, including Denmark still 
plan to consider them as “safe countries”, regardless of the deterioration of the political situation 
and even increase in rights violations against migrants and refugees in recent years. Additionally, no 
asylum legislation or refugee status exists in Morocco or Tunisia. Moreover, no person in need of 
international protection can have their situation investigated by an institution with national 
competence. Furthermore, mass arrests by law enforcement, forced displacement, detention of 
migrants, even when in a regular situation, and collective expulsions are on the rise in Morocco and 
Algeria.12 
 
While the number of people arriving on EU shores each year has decreased, the already poor 
protection standards for migrants and asylum seekers have only been further exacerbated.  Morocco 
and Tunisia’s migration and asylum systems have remained largely unreformed and outdated and 
offer little structural legal protection to migrants and asylum seekers.13 As Tunisia continues to lack 
migration and asylum legislation, no national authority has been designated to register, assist, or 
integrate refugees, asylum seekers and migrants into the country.14 
 
This point to the fact that the border control policies of both countries have been pushed by the EU 
and implemented with very low regard for the rights of migrants and refugees, leading to violations 
                                                 
 
10 International Federation for Human Rights, European Association for the defence of Human Rights, EuroMed Rights, 
“‘Safe’ countries: A denial of the right of asylum” 
11 EuroMed Rights “Maghreb countries « Safe » countries?” 
12 Ibid. 
13 Uzelac, “The Real Common Interest.” 
14 Chemlali, ”Mellem Håbet og Havet” 
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of international refugee law and further erosion of global human rights and refugee protection 
standards. This has been documented in Tunisia, as illegal practices are regularly used by Tunisian 
security forces. These include pushing back irregular migrants at Tunisian borders, detaining 
irregular migrants to prevent them from making asylum claims, depriving irregular migrants of their 
right to seek asylum, and refusing to allow irregular migrants to have access to lawyers and 
interpreters.15 This raises two fundamental question, if the Danish proposal would take place: who 
are the actors and authorities to cooperate with? And how will Denmark ensure international human 
rights? 
 
The justifications and loopholes  
The legislative proposal by the Danish government is framed as a humanitarian approach, with the 
objective to disrupt migrant smuggling networks. However, this stands in stark contrast to existing 
academic research on migration dynamics and smuggling, which have shown that smuggling 
networks have close ties to authorities responsible for migration control.16 Several UN reports have 
concluded that smuggling networks are inseparable from local authorities, including the links 
between the Libyan Coast Guard and Libyan smuggling networks, and similar cases have taken 
place in Morocco and Tunisia and Niger.17 Both EU co-operation with Libya and Turkey have also 
illustrated that when European governments delegate or outsource responsibility for border control, 
it creates political and economic incentives, which perceive Member states as willing to avoid 
asylum seekers, whatever the cost.  
 
This one-sided focus on smugglers in current European policy debates and border control measures 
tends to overshadow how other, public actors conduct violent abuse. Furthermore, new research 
shows how the majority of the money spent on smuggling is often used to bribe the authorities, thus 
indirectly contributing to migrant insecurity.18 Studies also show that the closure of borders has 
                                                 
 
15 Badalič, “Tunisia’s Role in the EU External Migration Policy.” 
16 Sanchez, “Beyond militias and tribes”; Mixed Migration Center, “Players of many parts”; Vammen et al. “Does 
information save migrants' lives?” 
17 Michael et al., “Making Misery Pay”; UN Security Council, “Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to 
resolution 1973 (2011)” 
18 Sanchez, “Beyond militias and tribes.” 
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increased the demand for, and use of, smugglers. They have in effect become the only option for 
people otherwise unable to use legal channels, like visas, to leave their countries or enter countries 
in which protection might be available to them. This is not only the case in North Africa but can 
also be documented across the Balkan Routes.19 Paying a smuggler is often the only way for 
migrants or asylum seekers to avoid border guards and pass barriers. One could argue that this 
development is caused in large part by the very security measures rolled out to stop it. 
 
The one-sided policy narrative of the ‘unscrupulous violent smuggler’ hides the fact that migrants 
also use smugglers to avoid the abuses of local authorities.20 In Tunisia for instance, there is little 
indication that irregular migration is rising due to heightened availability of smugglers. In contrast, 
a growing trend in Tunisia is 'self-smuggling', where Tunisians pool their money and buy boats 
traveling independently of hired smugglers.21 This points to the Danish proposal´s serious research 
gaps and lack in incorporating existing evidence and research informed policies.  
 
The Unintended Consequences?  
Existing research indicate that externalization of borders and migration regulatory efforts have 
several unintended consequences. This includes a risk of accepting poor governance in the countries 
that externalizing states depend on in relation to migration cooperation. This risk strengthening 
authoritarian regimes and repressive forces and forcing migrants out on more dangerous routes. 
Furthermore, the prevalence and risk of smuggling is increasing, as is the establishment of 
migration partnerships with countries not necessarily sympathized with, undermining the ability of 
refugees to receive the protection they need.22 A range of actors and agreements, technologies and 
infrastructures have led to migrant deterrence, pushbacks, and incarceration both at sea and on land. 
The increased securitization, surveillance, and border control both in North Africa and the 
Mediterranean Sea have however not prompted a decrease in migrant deaths and fatalities. Actually, 
quite the contrary is the case. Despite the fact that the number of people arriving on EU shores each 
                                                 
 
19 Paynte, “Europe’s refugee crisis explains why border walls don’t stop migration”; Karakoulaki and Tosidis, “Closed 
borders boost people smuggling across Balkans.” 
20 Vammen et al., “Does information save migrants' lives?” 
21 Ford, “Tunisia Tries to Help Migrants Avoid Slavery.” 
22 Sørensen, ”Migration og udviklingsbistand.” 
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year has decreased, the migration itself has become more deadly. Put differently: In total numbers 
the annual death toll has been falling in recent years, however, it is often argued that the “rate of 
migrant deaths” remains high, and that the risks that migrants face on their journeys have 
increased.23 Calculations indicate that the probability of dying while crossing the Central 
Mediterranean has increased in recent years despite a decrease in the absolute number of deaths and 
disappearances recorded on the crossing.24 
 
The Danish legislative proposal argues that this model would save people from drowning in the 
Mediterranean. But this claim does not take the existing data into account, which indicate the land 
journey across Sahara as far more dangerous than the Mediterranean.25 It is estimated that at least 
twice as many migrants die attempting to reach the Mediterranean as those who die attempting to 
cross the sea.26 The proposal´s insistence that people cannot apply for asylum in outsourced camps 
in third countries, but only by entering the asylum process on Danish territory, seems to do very 




Using the case of North Africa as a potential site for hosting extraterritorial asylum camps, points to 
several critical concerns and short fallings in the Danish legislative proposal. Including how the 
already poor protection standards for migrants and asylum seekers in the region have not only 
worsened in recent years, but also how human rights abuses, mass arrests and detention of migrants 
and refugees are on the rise. This low regard for the rights of migrants and refugees, can potentially 
lead to violations of international refugee law and further erosion of global human rights and 
refugee protection standards. Furthermore, some claims and justifications made in the proposal 
points to the disregard for existing data and research on smuggling and migration dynamics. To 
summarize, the Danish desires to export asylum responsibility to camps outside Europe leaves us 
with more questions than answers. 
                                                 
 
23 IOM, “Calculating ‘Death Rates’ in the Context of Migration Journeys.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 IOM, “Fatal Journeys” 
26 UNHCR, “Operational Portal: The Mediterranean Situation 2021.” 
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Three developments in the Danish asylum regime and 
the proposal to externalize: Thinking through camps 




The Frederiksen government’s proposal to externalize the Danish asylum system both builds on and 
breaks with developments in the Danish asylum regime over the past decades. In this paper, I draw 
out three of these developments, exemplified by three kinds of camps. These are: a shift towards the 
carceral (departure centers), the expansion of asylum policy priorities into the integration phase 
(temporary housing), and a concern with symbolic – or what I call “spectral” – politics of asylum 
(tent camps). My aim is to use these developments as domestic starting points from which to 
consider the new proposal to externalize the Danish asylum process, providing a different and 
complementary perspective on the proposal than more international analyses. 
 
Before I begin, let me make a quick terminological note: I am calling these various housing units 
"camps" not to imply that they are all camps in exactly the same way, but because that is the name 
used by most of the people living in them. So though there are clear and important distinctions to be 
made – and which I will be making – between the different kinds of camps, there is a certain 









                                                 
 
1 In this text, I'm drawing on my own research as well as a collaborative research project called The Carceral Mobility 
Project (CAMP) with Simon Turner (PI), Katrine Syppli Kohl, and Cecilie Jakobsen, housed at AMIS.  
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Departure centers and the carceral 
 
 
Figure 1: Kærshovedgaard Departure Center in 2017. Photo: Zachary Whyte 
The first kind of camp is what the Danish Immigration Service calls a “departure center” 
[udrejsecenter], which I use to illustrate the increasingly carceral and punitive trend in the Danish 
asylum regime. Kærshovedgaard departure centre (figure 1) is run by the Danish Prison Service to 
house rejected asylum seekers, as well as a variety of other people who do not have a right to 
remain in Denmark. These can include both those who have not renewed their residence permits in 
time, people who are not eligible for family reunification, and people who have had their rights to 
remain revoked as part of a criminal conviction. The center is a former prison, which was reopened 
as a departure center in 2016. While the residents are required to check in daily and are offered no 
benefits, they are not technically locked up there. The red building pictured originally formed part 
of a former asylum center, moved to provide additional capacity when Kærshovedgaard was still 
functioning as a prison2. This thus provides a fairly literal exemplification of the shifting political 
focus of Danish asylum policy from residence and activation3 to spectacles of detention and 
deportation4.  
                                                 
 
2 Whyte and Ulfstjerne, “Flexible shelters, modular meanings”  
3 Kohl, “Ambiguous encounters” 
4 Amit and Lindberg, “Performing states of crisis” 
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One striking recent development in the Danish asylum system is the remarkable fall in the number 
of asylum seekers – paralleled all over Europe through the combination of the the EU-Turkey deal 
and the COVID-19 pandemic – from the high point around 2015-17. From 94 operating asylum 
centres in the beginning of 2016, there are now only 12. The number of new arrivals seeking 
asylum is at the lowest mark since the current registration system was implemented in 1998. In 
2020, the Immigration Service registered 1547 asylum seekers, down from 21,316 in 2015. Despite 
this fall in the number of people seeking asylum, waiting times in the asylum phase have increased 
significantly from an average of 4,2 months in 2014-2015 to an average of 19,1 months in 2018-
2019.5 However, the number of departure centers has not fallen – indeed new ones have opened and 
the Danish asylum detention estate is now close to the capacity for ordinary housing of asylum 
seekers. As of 21st January, 2021, the Danish Immigration Service reports that it has a capacity of 
1450 spaces in residence centers, including specialized centers, catering to unaccompanied minors 
and women, and 1200 spaces in departure centers. (In addition there are 300 spaces in the reception 
centre, Sandholm). This is not to say those spaces are all filled, but the capacity levels certainly 
speak to the increasing carcerality of the Danish asylum system. The Danish asylum detention 
estate is growing in relative and absolute terms. 
 
It has been a feature of new Danish governments over the past two decades that they have regularly 
announced a firm commitment to increasing efforts to deport rejected asylum seekers. However, 
this continual and increasing political focus on removal and deportation has not been reflected in 
relatively high rates of success. In a recent article, Leerkes and Van Houte6 compare rates of 
deportation and assisted return between Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden. Drawing on Eurostat figures, they find that Denmark unsurprisingly has the lowest rates of 
assisted or voluntary return – unsurprising, because this has not been a consistent policy priority7. 
                                                 
 
5 Rockwool Foundation Research, https://www.rockwoolfonden.dk/app/uploads/2021/02/RFF_NYT-Ventetiden-i-
asylsystemet-marts-2021.pdf. Two things should be noted here: First, the waiting time was at an all-time low in 2014-
15 in part because many Syrians were granted a special humanitarian protection very quickly. Second, the average 
waiting time masks significant experiential variation for individual asylum seekers. 
6 Leerkes and Van Houte, “Beyond the deportation regime” 
7 Whyte and Hirslund, “International experiences with the sustainable assisted return of rejected asylum seekers” 
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But rates of forced return were also very low compared to the other Northern European countries. 
Leerkes and Van Houte “hypothesise that the Danish government’s anti-immigration and anti-
Muslim rhetoric, which may partially be aimed at warding off the competition by populist anti-
immigration parties, hampers the development of positive return incentives”8, and that this has 
knock-on effects on rates of compliance with forced return. 
 
The new proposal would almost certainly involve an acceleration of this trend. It establishes a new 
kind of removal, that the supplementary legal analysis is calling "accompanied forced transfers" 
[ledsaget tvangsmæssig overførsel] from Danish territory to the as yet unnamed country, where the 
asylum process is to take place. This adds to the wider typology of departures in use in Denmark, 
which include Dublin removals, deportations of various kinds (often called “accompanied 
departures” [ledsaget udrejse] by the police), "observed departures" [påset udrejse], “voluntary” 
repatriation, and what the Police calls "dropouts" [frafald], meaning asylum seekers who simply 
disappear from the system. Having made the risky and often expensive journey in to Europe, one 
has to presume, that a good number of new asylum seekers would object to being moved out of 
Europe again and would look to ”drop out”, rather than be transferred. This would entail either 
living in Denmark without documents or crossing borders irregularly to other European countries. If 
the authorities want to stop them from doing so, it will require the further expansion of the Danish 
asylum detention estate and a system of closed camps. The proposal would thus likely either mean 
an increase in irregular stays and border movement or would entail an even more strict locking up 









                                                 
 
8 Leerkes and Van Houte, op.cit., page 333. 
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Temporary housing and integration as deterrence 
 
 
Figure 2: A temporary housing unit for refugees in Næstved in 2017. Photo: Zachary Whyte 
The second kind of “camps” are temporary housing units for recognized refugees. I use them to 
illustrate the ways in which the uncertainties of the asylum phase have been making their way in to 
the integration phase for recognized refugees.9 At the same time, Danish integration policy is 
increasingly also being used as part of a deterrence regime. That is to say, that the conditions under 
which recognized refugees live are presented as part of a system designed to deter would-be asylum 
seekers from coming to Denmark in the first place.10 
 
Under Danish law, asylum seekers who are recognized as refugees in Denmark are assigned to a 
municipality, which is then responsible for their integration program and for finding them suitable 
housing. The temporary housing unit illustrated above forms part of a pavilion system (figure 2) 
which is used in some municipalities to house these refugees, because they can be quickly put up 
and moved. These kinds of housing units have regularly been used to house asylum seekers for the 
                                                 
 
9 See also Kohl et al., ”I Danmark kommer mange flygtninge aldrig ud af lejren” 
10 Brekke, “The struggle for control”, Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Refugee policy as ‘negative nation branding’” 
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same reasons across the past decades11. However, repurposed municipal buildings, such as 
retirement homes, schools, or even town halls, are also in common use. These sorts of buildings 
were regularly used as asylum centers in the past decade, especially in rural municipalities, where 
centralization and demographic change emptied many of them out12. However, as asylum centers 
are closed down to reduce costs as the number of arrivals wanes, these sorts of buildings are 
increasingly being pressed in to use as temporary housing for refugees, meaning that refugees may 
literally be housed in the same kinds of buildings they lived in while their asylum cases were being 
processed. This in turn entails some of the same rounds of life as those offered in asylum centers, 
living with strangers in tight circumstances13. 
 
This is in part a result of the combination of the extremely low levels of social benefits available to 
refugees and the lack of cheap housing in most municipalities. The changing names given to these 
social benefits are instructive: from "start aid" [starthjælp] in 2002 to "integration benefits" 
[integrationsydelse] in 2015 to "self-support and repatriation benefits" [selvforsørgelses- og 
hjemrejseydelse] in 2020.14 Symbolically, then, they move from beginnings to integration to return. 
Researchers at The Rockwool Foundation calculated that the original “start aid” made refugees the 
poorest group in Danish society15. Since then – and with each name change – rates have been 
further reduced. 
 
Physically, then, recognized refugees are increasingly living in camp-like spaces. But the 
fundamental uncertainty that characterizes the asylum phase and life in the camps has also been on 
the rise for refugees in Denmark. In recent years, there has been an increased effort to revoke 
resident permits for refugees, expanding what Nicholas de Genova calls deportability – the 
precariousness of life that comes with the continuous risk of being deported.16 Denmark has been a 
                                                 
 
11 Whyte and Ulfstjerne, “Flexible shelters, modular meanings” 
12 Whyte et al., “New neighbours in a time of change” 
13 Whyte, “In process” 
14 These lower rates for refugees were rescinded under the Social Democratic Thorning Schmidt government (2011-
2015) as part of their elimination of so-called “poverty benefits” [fattigdomsydelser]. They were re-instituted in 2015. 
15 Andersen et al., “Lowering welfare benefits” 
16 De Genova, “Migrant ‘illegality’ and deportability in everyday life”. See also Rytter and Ghandchi, “Workers for 
free” for a description of the lived effects of everyday deportability on Afghans in Denmark; Vitus and Jarlby, “Between 
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frontrunner in designating parts of Syria, Somalia, and Eritrea as safe for return. These assertions 
have been forcefully disputed not only by the refugees themselves, but also by international 
organizations and country experts. In some cases, as with the notorious Eritrea country of origin 
report17, Denmark has been the only European state taking this stance, though other countries have 
been following developments with interest. At the same time, the sheer velocity and volume of legal 
changes in itself creates uncertainty for refugees, as for example expanding requirements for 
permanent residence can render the work done to live up to previous rules obsolete. It is worth 
reiterating that this sort of extended uncertainty does documented damage to mental health18. 
 
The externalization proposal proposes something quite radical here, namely doing away with the 
asylum phase on Danish ground altogether. The explicitly stated goal of the Frederiksen 
government is to have no asylum seekers arrive in Denmark at all and thereby to also stop the 
recognition of new refugees in Denmark. (Note that this might not preclude the arrival of quota 
refugees) Now, the consequences of this are a little hard to get a grip on. If effected – and as I shall 
return to, it is far from certain that the proposal presently has enough substance for anyone to really 
speculate on its effects – it certainly would also tear out the refugees from the systems that, after all, 
are working to some extent. One of the rather unheralded bits of news on Danish integration is that 
despite the disruption entailed by deterrence as a policy priority, on many parameters, including 







                                                                                                                                                                  
 
integration and repatriation” for an account of the impact of conflicting policy goals on the lives of young refugees; 
and Turnbull, “Living the spectre of forced return”, for a description from the UK. 
17 Rosset and Liodden, “The Eritrea report” 
18 Hvidtfeldt et al., “Prolonged periods of waiting for an asylum decision and the risk of psychiatric diagnoses”; von 
Werthern et al., “The impact of immigration detention on mental health” 
19 European Web Site on Integration: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/governance/denmark  
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Tent camps and spectral politics 
 
 
Figure 3: Tent camp in Næstved in 2016. Photo: Rebecca Campbell 
The third and last kind of camp I will mention are the now-defunct Danish tent camps, in active use 
for about a year in 2016, which I use to illustrate what I'm calling “the spectral politics of asylum”, 
which starts from the understanding that the presentation of asylum policy increasingly is part of its 
functioning. The Danish tent camps were put up very quickly, at the beginning of 2016, but they 
were emptied more or less by the end of the year. However, some of them still stood for a number 
of years after, heated and inflated behind wire fences. They were controversial from the beginning 
and became mired in scandal amid stories of abuses of power in one of the tent camps in particular. 
But as colleagues and I have argued, this controversy was an important part of the functioning of 
the tent camps20. In our work on these tent camps, we have thought of them in terms of two 
paradoxes: spectacular obscurity and successful failure. Spectacular obscurity captures the contrast 
between the great fanfare under which they were presented and the fact that everyday life in the tent 
camps was largely obscured. At the same time, and as was well documented, they were full of small 
bits of failure, everything from the hot water not working to sewers backing up. And all of these 
failures, in a sense, undergirded some of the explicit policy goals. The idea was precisely to make 
                                                 
 
20 Whyte et al., “Paradoxical infrastructures of asylum” 
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the stay at asylum centers as uncomfortable as possible.21 In this sense, the failures of humane 
treatment were part of how the system was meant to work. They were successful failures. 
 
Much of this resonates with current Danish asylum policy. The spectacularity of the Danish jewelry 
law, which mandated the confiscation of jewelry worth more than a certain value from arriving 
asylum seekers, contrasted with the obscurity of the actual jewelry: Indeed, the law has barely seen 
use. Similarly, newspaper ads were taken out in Lebanese newspapers describing the difficulties of 
life in Denmark. There was a plan for establishing a departure center on the island of Lindholm, 
previously used for as a research center for animal diseases. And all of this is what Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen together has called negative nation branding, like a reverse tourist campaign 
whereby prospective asylum seekers are told not to come, that things are awful, you will hate it. 
Further, these sorts of policies may serve to obscure other, less dramatic, restrictions being rolled 
out, like the steady ratcheting up of the requirements for permanent residence permits or citizenship. 
Some of these policies have foundered or been retracted and have in that sense failed. But at the 
same time, and in part because of the outrage they stoked, they can also be seen as successes from 
the perspective of a Danish government, whose aim is to communicate a forbidding image so as to 
deter asylum seekers.  
 
One of the striking features of this new externalization proposal is precisely its spectral or ghost-
like nature. It looks fearsome, a harbinger of a radical relocation of the Danish asylum regime, but 
is at the same time essentially insubstantial in its present form. It is unclear which if any state could 
be enticed to take over the running of the Danish asylum system, under what conditions, what legal 
and policy repercussions it might have, let alone something as mundane as how much it would cost. 
But in a sense, the effect of the proposal is precisely detached from its tangibility. Which is to say, 
that even if it were to fail to materialize as policy, it will still have made an impact on Danish 
asylum politics, in part through the very controversy it engenders. And if it were to fail, it would 
have allowed the government to position itself as radically restrictive in a political marketplace, 
where this is understood to be valuable, at no financial cost and without an actual change in policy. 
                                                 
 
21 As Kohl notes, this concern with keeping standards low in the asylum phase, so as to discourage additional asylum 
seekers, was part of the original thinking when the Danish asylum system was instituted in 1984 (Kohl, “Asylaktivering 
og ambivalens”).  
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Conclusion 
In this short paper, I have presented three current developments in Danish asylum policy as 
illustrated by three kinds of camps. I have used departure centers to illustrate the carceral trend in 
the Danish asylum system; temporary housing for refugees to illustrate the seepage of asylum 
dynamics and policy priorities into the integration phase; and tent camps to illustrate the 
increasingly spectral nature of Danish asylum politics. The new proposal to externalize the asylum 
system in some ways builds on these developments. For example, it would likely expand the asylum 
detention estate in Denmark further. But in other ways, it would radically reshape Danish asylum 
policy, by attempting to shift it out from the domestic sphere altogether. Because the specifics of the 
proposal are so nebulous, it is hard to confidently evaluate its possible effects. Central questions are 
not just unanswered but barely asked in the current proposal. These issues notwithstanding, the 
proposal can also be understood as what I have called a spectral politics of asylum. In this sense, the 
domestic debates sparked by the proposal may be understood as part of its functioning.  
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Denmark and extraterritorial asylum: International law 
and lessons from practice 
Nikolas Feith Tan, Senior Researcher, Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) 
 
Introduction 
The idea of externalising asylum processing and/or protection to another state is not new. Indeed, 
‘destination’ states in the Global North have been proposing and, in some cases, implementing such 
approaches since as early as 1986.1 In this contribution I focus on four aspects of extraterritorial 
asylum policy, international law and lessons learned from such approaches in other jurisdictions. 
The intervention first addresses responsibility sharing under the 1951 Refugee Convention; second 
compares international practice on extraterritorial asylum; third outlines the various extraterritorial 
asylum processing models from practice; and, finally, sets out relevant human rights and refugee 
law standards applicable to both extraterritorial processing of asylum seekers and protection of 
refugees.  
 
Responsibility sharing and shifting 
The transfer of a person from one state to another for the purposes of the asylum processing is not, 
in and of itself, a breach of international law. But such arrangements can and have resulted in 
serious breaches of international human rights and refugee law. A primary purpose of the 1951 
Refugee Convention is to ‘assure refugees the widest possible exercise of their fundamental rights 
and freedoms’.2 The Convention preamble further acknowledges that sharing responsibility for 
refugees between states is possible, given that refugees can place an undue burden on specific 
states. Such responsibility sharing should provide a real set of rights and protections and not amount 
to a system that simply shifts responsibility for protection from one state to another that is incapable 
of providing such protection, as we have seen in the past.3 
 
                                                 
 
1 Nikolas Feith Tan, "The Manus Island Regional Processing Centre." 
2 Preamble to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 
1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention), (1951). 
3 James C Hathaway, "The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere."  
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Comparing international practice 
Considering the Danish proposal in international context, the following examples are the most 
closely related to the current law proposal and have informed the Danish policy process. Some of 
these have been extensively covered in the literature, while others are less well known: 
• US extraterritorial processing in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, since the 1990s;4  
• Australia’s Pacific Solution in place from 2001 to 2007;5  
• Australia’s Operation Sovereign Borders from 2012 onward;6  
• EU-Turkey Statement in operation since 2016;7   
• US and Guatemala’s Asylum Cooperative Agreement.8   
 
There are key differences between the Australian and US approaches flagged above and Denmark’s 
proposal for extraterritorial asylum. Both Australia and the US have extensive maritime borders that 
can be used to directly defend against irregular migration. As a result, deflecting asylum seekers 
from both Australia and the US, in fact, does contribute to stopping departures of asylum seekers. 
On the other hand, while extraterritorial asylum policy undertaken by Denmark would almost 
certainly reduce arrivals in Denmark, it would not reduce dangerous journeys to other European 
states, given Denmark’s geography.  
 
Moreover, there are key legal differences between the Danish context and the Australian and the 
US. Most notably the European Convention on Human Rights offers binding protections against, 
for example refoulement and collective expulsion, while the absence of the binding regional treaty 
                                                 
 
4 Azadeh Dastyari, United States Migrant Interdiction and the Detention of Refugees in Guantánamo Bay (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
5 See, for example, Susan Kneebone, "The Pacific Plan.” 
6 Madeline Gleeson, “Offshore.” 
7 Daniel Thym, ’Why the EU-Turkey Deal can be Legal and a Step in the Right Direction’, Verfassungsblog, 9 March 
2016; Maximilian Steinbeis, ’Three legal requirements for the EU-Turkey deal: An interview with James Hathaway’, 
Verfassungsblog, 9 March 2016.  
8 Daniel Ghezelbash, "Hyper-legalism and Obfuscation."  
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body in both Australia and the US is notable. In short, the models undertaken in Australia and the 
US would be unlawful if undertaken by Denmark.  
 
Finally, there are some important geopolitical factors at play here. Both Australia and the US are 
regional powers with immediate Global South neighbours, which has made the selection and 
identification of a relevant and approachable ‘partner’ state far more accessible than in the Danish 
case.  
 
Conceptualising extraterritorial asylum  
Externalization has been usefully defined as ‘measures taken by states beyond their borders to 
obstruct or deter the arrival of foreign nationals lacking permission to enter their intended 
destination country.’9 Other definitions specify that these measures may also include pre-emptive 
and indiscriminate containment of people beyond a state´s territory, outsourced through public, 
commercial and other non-state venues.10 While externalization thus refers to a broad suite of 
extraterritorial migration control measures, encompassing visa controls, carrier sanctions, maritime 
interception and pushbacks, extraterritorial asylum is just one example of such approaches. I want 
to conceptualize three distinctive legal models of extraterritorial asylum to assess which state that 
has what level of responsibility for persons transferred.11  
 
First, extraterritorial asylum processing may be conceived of on the basis of exclusive partner state 
jurisdiction. Under this model, cooperation is primarily focused on the transfer of asylum seekers 
from one state to another. After transfer, the partner State assumes complete responsibility for the 
asylum seeker, including the asylum procedure and reception conditions. This model commonly 
employs the ‘safe third country’ concept, encapsulated in both the EU-Turkey Statement and the 
Asylum Cooperative Agreement.12 
 
                                                 
 
9 Jeff Crisp, “What is Externalization and Why is it a Threat to Refugees?”  
10 Lemberg-Pedersen, “Manufacturing displacement”. 
11 Tan, "The Manus Island Regional Processing Centre." 
12 Ghezelbash, "Hyper-legalism and Obfuscation." 
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Second, extraterritorial asylum may take place on the basis of joint jurisdiction between destination 
and partner state. This model is characterised by a high level of destination and partner state 
involvement in the reception or processing of asylum seekers. The Australian-led regional 
processing centres on Nauru and Papua New Guinea are a good example of such an approach.13  
Third, in rare cases extraterritorial asylum may take place on the basis of exclusive destination state 
jurisdiction. Such a situation will only take place where the partner State’s role is limited to offering 
the use of its territory to the destination State. The US-Guantanamo arrangement is an example of 
this practice whereby, under a perpetual lease agreement, Cuba has granted the US exclusive 




Currently Denmark is considering two possible models. Under Model 1, Denmark will have 
jurisdiction over the centre. Under Model 2, the third country will have jurisdiction. Here I flag the 
key rights that I would be particularly concerned about under both models.14  
 
Firstly, the principle of non-refoulement is flowing from, among others, Article 3 in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), preventing the transfer of any person to a well-founded fear 
or persecution or a real risk of serious harm. It is worth noting here that when Denmark has 
jurisdiction over the centre, Denmark will also owe non-refoulement obligations in the centre.15 The 
Danish Institute for Human Rights has emphasized that Denmark must consider its non-refoulement 
obligations when persons present themselves spontaneously to such a centre. That is not to suggest 
that Denmark must provide asylum processing to those arriving spontaneously, but simply that 
Denmark owes obligations to everyone under their control in a third country centre.16  
                                                 
 
13 Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on the fourth and fifth periodic reports of Australia; Human 
Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Australia. 
14 Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration, Juridisk analyse af mulighederne for overførsel af asylansøgere til 
asylsagsbehandling i et tredjeland inden for rammerne af international ret, 1. 
15 See, for example, Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011 (European Court of Human 
Rights). 
16 See further Danish Institute for Human Rights, Human Rights Obligations and Third Country Asylum Processing 
(January 2021).  
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Secondly, there is the access to fair and efficient asylum procedures as provided for in the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights with respect to Article 3 ECHR. Individuals must receive 
adequate information about the asylum procedure, a reliable system of communication between the 
asylum seeker and the authorities, effective access to interpreters and legal aid as required, and a 
fair and effective asylum system in the third country.17  
 
Thirdly, there is the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR. Denmark must asylum 
seekers with the ability to appeal their cases and ensure that appeal goes to an independent, 
competent authority with suspensive effect.18 Finally, there are questions of liberty and security. 
Past extraterritorial asylum policies have involved arbitrary detention for very long periods of 
time.19 Here Article 5 ECHR protects against arbitrary detention and other unlawful restrictions on 
freedom of movement.  
 
Past practice has been problematic in this area. At the Australian-run centres in both Nauru and 
Papua New Guinea, there were no functioning asylum systems when people were transferred. As a 
result, the asylum seekers waited in detention for about two years before the first decisions were 
made.20 Under the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative Agreement, 939 asylum seekers were 
transferred to Guatemala for the purposes of asylum processing. Guatemala’s asylum system only 
had six employees, and it has presently not finalized any asylum decisions yet.21 
 
Protection standards 
Moving from extraterritorial asylum processing models and standards, I want to finally address the 
protection element of such third country approaches. It is important to think beyond the procedural 
                                                 
 
17 MSS v Belgium and Greece, Application no 30696/09 21 January 2011 (European Court of Human Rights). 
18 A.M. v. the Netherlands, Application no. 29094/09, 5 July 2016 (European Court of Human Rights). 
19 See, for example, Azadeh Dastyari and Maria O'Sullivan, "Not for Export." 
20 UNHCR, UNHCR monitoring visit to Manus Island, Papua New Guinea, 23 to 25 October 2013; UNHCR, UNHCR 
monitoring visit to the Republic of Nauru 7 to 9 October 2013; Patrick van Berlo, "The Protection of Asylum Seekers in 
Australian-Pacific Offshore Processing.” 
21 Refugees International and Human Rights Watch, Failure of Protection under the US-Guatemala Asylum 
Cooperative Agreement; Ghezelbash, "Hyper-legalism and Obfuscation." 
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and rights questions arising in the fairly short time that an asylum process takes, to the equally 
important question of how refugees can be afforded protection in the third country and to what 
degree Denmark would have responsibility for that protection. The key question is what obligations 
does the Refugee Convention oblige Denmark to live up to when transferring a person to a third 
country? Articles 2-34 of the Refugee Convention are structured in a such a way that rather than 
being given a universal set of rights upon arrival, the refugee gains or accrues rights as the 
connection to the asylum state grows over time.  
 
What is often lost beyond questions of non-refoulement, is the series of civil and socioeconomic 
rights set down in the Refugee Convention. To my mind, there are three possible interpretations of 
the Refugee Convention with respect to Denmark’s potential obligations at the point of transfer. 
The first is that Denmark might only owe the non-refoulement obligation. It is clear from both the 
proposal and the literature that non-refoulement is a baseline obligation under any such 
extraterritorial asylum policy. 
 
The second possibility is that, as well as non-refoulement, Denmark would also owe asylum seekers 
the ‘acquired rights’ that they already entitled to in Denmark, that is to say, the few rights that a 
person receives within a state’s jurisdiction and territory, for example the right to freedom of 
religion.22  
 
The third interpretation holds that it is not just non-refoulement or ‘acquired rights’ but that 
Denmark must respect all rights contained in the Refugee Convention.23 If the Convention is 
designed to provide a maximal set of protections to refugees, then to transfer someone obliges a 
state to ensure that the full set of rights are, in fact, available.24 The High Court of Australia seemed 
to agree with this approach in the M70 case, finding that there were obligations well beyond non-
                                                 
 
22 Hathaway, "The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere." 
23 Hathaway, "The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere." 
24 Michelle Foster, "The Implications of the Failed 'Malaysian Solution'.” 
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refoulement, extending to access to courts of law, freedom from discrimination, and treatment at 
least as favourable as nationals with respect to employment, education, and religious freedom.25 
  
While the jury is still out on this interpretative question, I would argue that the core rights contained 
in the Refugee Convention must be available in the third country. In particular, the right to primary 
education (article 22), right to work (article 17), access to housing (article 21), freedom of 
movement (article 26) and right to identity documents (article 28) are essential for the realisation of 
protection in any asylum state. 
 
Previous extraterritorial asylum policies have not met these standards. In Papua New Guinea, for 
example, even once refugees were free from detention, many could not integrate in the host 
community because of religious tensions between the local community and the refugees.26 
Similarly, hundreds of refugees have, in fact, ended up in Australia because of the need for medical 
care not available in Nauru and Papua New Guinea.27 Others have been resettled to Canada and 
Europe because of the lack of durable solutions in Nauru and Papua New Guinea.28 
 
Conclusion 
In closing, it is worth returning to the Refugee Convention’s raison d’etre as providing the greatest 
possible protection to refugees. While the current system of territorial asylum is flawed, equally 
transferring asylum processing and protection to a third country would represent a massive shift in 
the Danish and international asylum system. Moreover, as a matter of international human rights 
                                                 
 
25 Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, [2011] HCA 32 (High Court of Australia 31 August 2011). See also Hathaway, "The 
Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere." and Foster, "The Implications of the Failed 'Malaysian Solution'." 
26 JC Salyer, "The Denial of Human Dignity in the Age of Human Rights under Australia's Operation Sovereign 
Borders."  
27 Gabrielle Holly, "Transnational Tort and Access to Remedy under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights.”; Gabrielle Holly, "Challenges to Australia's Offshore Detention Regime and the Limits of Strategic 
Tort Litigation.". 
28 Hannah Ryan and Michael Green. 16.12.2020. 'Suffered more than many': how Canada and Europe are resettling 
Australia’s refugees, The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/dec/17/canada-
europe-resettling-australia-refugees  
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and refugee law, Denmark cannot simply delegate its responsibility to asylum seekers and refugees 
to a third country. 
 
In sum, for extraterritorial asylum to work, it must provide for international protection, not simply 
the absence of a fear of persecution. While international law does not forbid extraterritorial asylum, 
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